Recent Cases by Editors,
RECENT CASES.
BAKi.x--DaosiTS-CH.CKs-Checks, indorsed in blank and deposited
in bank, were lost in the mail. After six weeks, during which the bank
made no effort to collect, the maker failed. Held: Neither the custom
of the bank nor the rule that dishonor of checks will permit the bank. on due
notice of non-payment, to charge depositor as indorser, for there was in
fact no dishonor. Heinrich v. First National Bank of Middletown, 113
N. . 531 (N. Y. 1916).
If a check is indorsed in blank, deposited and credited to the depositor
as cash. the weight of authority is that title is pi'ma facie in the bank.
though that yields to the intention of the parties. South Park Foundry and
Machine Co. v. Chicago R. R. Co., 75 Minn. 186 (1899); Aebi v. Bank of
Evansville, 12-4 Wis. 73 (i9os). Intention may be shown by the bank's ac-
tion in granting a right to draw on the funds. Fourth National Bank v.
Mayer, 89 Ga. io8 (i89g). Some courts hold that title is prima facie in the
depositor, as in the leading case of Balbach v. Frelinghuysen, z5 Fed. 675
(1883).
A bank receiving paper for collection undertakes to use due diligence
in making demand at maturity, and in giving proper notices of non-payment,
and unreasonable delay charges the bank for the amount of the loss.
Capitol State Bank v. Lane. 52 Miss. 677 (t876); Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v.
First National Bank, 2-o Colorado App. 5-9 (19os). -It is not necessary to
prove an agreement for compensation, for the law implies such a contract.
Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Bank, supra. Proof that the paper would not
have been paid, if presented, is no defense. Capitol State Bank v. Lane,
supra; Bank v. Kenan, ;6 N. C. 340 (1877). Depositor is so far discharged
that he is not liable even if he indorses a duplicate check sent by the maker.
Aebi N1. Bank. supra. If the depositor consents to pay the bank the amount
of the loss. such an agreement is nudum pachun,, for it lacks consideration.
Bank v. Kenan, mipra. Only a valid new contract will make him liable.
Aebi v. Bank, supra. He will be held liable if the bank can show that a
person of ordinary prudence would act as it did. 1lerider v. Phoenix Loan
Assn., 82 Mo. App. 4-" (1899). Depositors of paper for collection may be
bound by a custom which is reasonable and sufficiently general to justify the
presumption that it is a known custom. Farley National Bank v. Bern-
heimer, 145 Ala. 321 (9o5). A bank is also relieved of liability, if the
depositor requests that collection be delayed and that checks be sent to
an out-of-the-way bank which fails. Bedell v. Harbine Bank, 62 Neb. 339
69o0).
In accord with the principal case is Spooner v. Bank of Donalsonville,
82 S. E. 625 (Ga. 1914).
BAX KRUPTCY-PREFEREx.CES-VALIITY-PLtDGE-DEFFNSES-In an action
by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover sum- paid defendant creditor by the
bankrupt within four months of the banknrptcy and at a time -when he
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was insolvent, the court refused defendant creditors' offer to prove that
the sums so paid were the proceeds of the sale of automobiles which, more
than four months prior to the bankruptcy, the bankrupt had agreed to pledge
with the creditor to protect him from liability on certain notes of the bank-
rupt which he had endorsed. Possession here was retained by the pledgor.
Held: It was error to refuse evidence to establish this defense, and the
jury should pass on it. Davis v. Billings, Appellant, 254 Pa. 595 (1i96).
To be voidable as a preference under the Bankruptcy Act. Section 6ob,
it must appear that the transfer was made within four months before the
petition in bankruptcy was filed; that the bankrupt was insolvent, and that
the transferee had reasonable cause to believe that the enforcement of the
transfer would effect a preference. Ilagar v. Watt. 232 Fed. 373 (1916);
Grandison v. Natl. Bank of Commerce of Buffalo, 231 Fed. 8oo (1916).
However, the exercise of a pre-existing right within-the four months, unless
made with intent to hinder of defraud creditors, is not an illegal preference.
Macdonald v. Aetna Indemfity Co., 97 At. 332 (Conn. i916). Where a pledgee
takes possession in pursuance and in the enforcement of his pre-existing
right, he is prima facie presumed to take in the belief in his right. Taney
v. Perin Bank, 23 U. S. 174 (1913): Dale v. Pattison. 234 U. S. 399 (1913).
When this pre-existing right attaches is a question of local, not federal,
law. Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516 (19o4); Holtv. Crucible Steel
Co. of America. 224 U. S. _,62 (1912). The local law also determines the
validity of the claim. It is the lien created -by a levy, judgment, attach-
ment or otherwise, -that is invalidated by the act, and where the lien is
obtained more than four months prior to the filing of the petition, its
validity will be recognized. Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U. S. j65 (1902);
Owen v. Brown.-i1o Fed. 812 (i9o,3). Though in the ordinary cases of the
pledge of chatf0Ils possession of the property by the pledgee is indispensable
to the validity of the pledge, where the possession is by the agreement
of the parties, to remain with the pledgor, all are bound who claim under
him except purchasers for value without notice. Collin's Appeal, 3 Penny-
packer Pa. Rep. 333 (1882); Fisher v. Zollinger, 149 Fed. 54 (i9o6).
Such an agreement as the one in the principal case creates an equitable
lien upon the property indicated, enforceable against the property in the
hands not only of the original pledgor, but of his heirs, administrator,
executor, voluntary assignee, and purchasers or encumbrancers with notice.
3 Pomeroy's Eq. juris., Sec. t235.
CO.NFLItr OF L.%ws-DivoRcE-A statute declared void all divorce decrees
obtained by its inhabitants in foreign states or countries for causes occur-
ring while they are resident in the home state, or for causes which are in-
sufficient in such home state. ld: This law does not apply where such in-
habitants, not domiciled in the foreign state, go there and procure a divorce
for a cause recognized though not occurring in the home state. Chapman
v. Chapman. 113 X. E. 359 (Mass. 1916).
A divorce decree of a court having no jurisdiction over the parties
may be declared void elsewhere, People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247 (1872);
In re James Estate, 99 CaL 374 (1893), as where the parties are not resi-
496 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
dents of the state at the time its court issues the decree. Barber v. Root.
1o Mass. -,6o (1813); Dunlop v. Dunlop, 3 Ky. Law Rep. 2o (188i). On
the contrary, some courts consider appearance by the parties sufficient to
give jurisdiction. Kinnier v. Kinnier, 58 Barb. 424 (N. Y. 1869) ; ha re Ellis
Estate, 55 Minn. 401 (1893). In such case personal service on the respond-
ent is necessary. Holmes v. Holmes, 8 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) i C.N. Y. 187o);
Bell v. Bell, 40 N. Y. Sup. 443 (1896). Where the parties have bona fide
left a state and have intentionally acquired residence elsewhere, a foreign
divorce decree is valid in the home state, even though the cause accrued
there. Gregory v. Gregory, ;6 Me. 535 (1884).
Foreign decrees are void, particularly if obtained on a ground which does
not justify a divorce in the domicile state. Jackson v. Jackson, i Johns
424 (N. Y. i866); Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass. 156 (1877); seemingly contra,
Davis v. Davis, 22 N. Y. Supp. 191 (1893). This is true whether the re-
spondent appears or not. Chase v. Chase, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 157 (1856).
Such a decree is not void but voidable in Pennsylvania. Appeal of Rich-
ardson, 132 Pa. St. - (i89o).
Article IV, Section i, of the United States Constitution, requiring a state
to give full credit to the records of sister states does not prevent the record
of a decree of divorce granted in a sister state from being impeached for
fraud. German Savings & Loan Society v. Dormitzer, 192 U. S. 125 (19o4).
Feigned ignorance of respondent's address, Doughty v. Doughty, 28 N. J.
Eq. (i Stew.) 581 (1877); or a fabricated case, Vischer v. Vischer, Y2 Barb.
64o (N. Y. s85t); or intentional errors in the publication notice may
constitute the fraud. Stanton v. Crosby, 9 Hun. 370 (N. Y. 1876); Field
v. Field, 215 Ill. 496 (i9o5). Or it may consist only in the taking of resi-
dence in a foreign state solely to obtain divorce, Forrest v. Forrest, 2 Edm.
Sel. Cas. i8o (N. Y. 185o) ; Chase v. Chase, supra.
It is presumed that a court had jurisdiction when the decree appears
on its face to be regular. Rendleman v. Rendlcman, z8 111. 257 (1886);
McHenry v. Brackin, 1o N. W. 96o (Minn. 19o4). But some courts hold that
even a recital in the decree showing jurisdiction does not preclude inquiry
as to this. Commonwealth v. Blood, 9; Mass. 5.38 (1867); People v. Dawell,
sutra.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLV. xIA*-VORK31 EN'S
COMPENSATION AcT-VAutW11TY-To the objection that the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act of 1915, P. L. 736, was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
held: First. the section which abolishes the defenses of "assumption of
risk" and "negligence of fellow employee" is not in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor does it
deprive the employer of his property without the "judgment of his peers or
the laws of the land" under Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of
Pennsylvania. Second. the act does not preclude the right to a trial by
jury as protected in Article I, Section 6. of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
because of the election feature of the act. Third. the objection that it
violates Article III, Section 21, which provides that the Legislature shall
not limit the amount to be recovered for injuries is also met by this same
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elective feature. .Nnderson v. Carnegie Steel Company, 2;. Pa. 33 (916).
It has .been repeatedly held that an act which abolishes the common-
law defenses of the fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk and contributory
negligence is not thereby rendered unconstitutional. Matheson v. Minn.
St. Railway Co., 148 S. W. 71 (Minn. 1914); Borguis v. The Falk Co.,
147 Wis. 320 (1911), and cases therein cited. The ground upon which such
a ruling has been based is that a person has no vested interest or prop-
erty in a rule of common law, but simply in rights or property acquired
under it. Mondon v. N. Y., N. I-1. & H. R. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1 (1911) ; Young
v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346 (1914).
The Pennsylvania court in the prilcipal case deals as most other courts
have with the objection that a right to trial by jury is taken away. When
the election has once been made, the act itself then becomes a part of
the contract of employment, and can be enforced as between the parties as
_.uch. Desbeikis v. Link Belt Co., 261 Ill. 454 (1914); State. ex rcL.,
v. Creamer, 85 Ohio State 386 (1912).
The Pennsylvania act is similar to the recent Workmen's Compensa-
tion acts of the other states in its main features, and tIle grounds.upon
which these acts have been upheld by the other' courts are much the
same.
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDNcE-OTHER OFF.Nsi':s-In a prosecution for un-
lawful assault upon a girl, evidence that accused had assaulted another girl
three years before, though offered to show intent, is inadmissible. Hall v.
U. S., 235 Fed. 869 (T916).
Other crimes than the one for which the defendant is on trial are not
admissible to prove the corpus delicti, but only where the act constituting
the crime tinder investigation has been clearly established, and the motive,
intent, or guilty knowledge is in issue. People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 2-64
(igo); Kahn v. State, 1o5 N. E. 385 (Ind. 1914). The prosecution cannot
prove the commission of other like offenses for the purpuse of increasing
the likelihood that defendant committed the particular offense charged.
McAllister v. State, 112 Wis. 496 (i0oo): People v. Bertsche, .265 ill. 272
(1914). The rule is well established, that evidence of separate and sim-
ilar offenses is admissible to show criminal intent. State v. Bowen, 134 Pac.
623 (Utah 1913): Taggett v. City of Tuscaloosa, 67 So. 780 (Ala. 1915).
But such proof must be within reasonable limits. State v. Brown, 85 Adt.
797 (Del. 1912).
It must not be too remote in time. Rash v. State, 69 So. 239 (Ala.'
1915); Moffatt v. U. S.. 232 Fed. 522 (1916). Acts one year previous are
admissible. Comm. v. Lindsey, iii N. E. 869 (Mass. 1916). And such
testimony can be admitted, when of substantive value, even though it
establishes the commission of other offenses. Dykes v. State, io Pac.
84 (Okla. 1915); People v. Cornell, I55 Pac. io2,6 (Cal. 1916). As in a
prosecution for lewd acts with a child, proof of prior lascivious acts, even
though showing the commission of the crime of sodomy, was relevant.
People v. Love, 157 Pac. 9 (Cal. 1916). Acts of a kindred character both
prior and subsequent are to be admitted. McCreary v. Comm., 163 Ky. 2o6
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(1915); Trent v. U. S., 28 Fed. 648 (1916). Improper sexual relations of
the accused, previous to the crime for which he is on trial, are admis-
sible, when they will throw light upon the motive of accused, and also in-
dicate his design in regard to his practices at a particular place. Frank v.
State, 8o S. E. ioi6 (Ga. 1914). But in all such cases where evidence of sim-
ilar offenses is introduced, the jury should be charged that such evidence
was to be considered in determining, whether the defendant intended to do
the act, not whether he attempted to do it. Webb v. State. 187 S. W. 485
(Tx. 1916).
CRIAIIAL LAw-JUsPIcrIu oF Cotr OF OQ,.'AT R S:ssIO.s-PuN-
SYLVANIA AcT OF J.cxe 2, i87i-\Vhere a prisoner, sentenced to the House
of Correction on a summary conviction before'a magistrate was discharged
on probation, it was held, the Court of Quarter Sessions, in habeas corpus
proceedings under the Act of June - 1871, though not bound by defects in
the magistrate's record, could not sentence the prisoner for a longer term
than had been imposed by the committing magistrate. Com. v. Cohen. 63
Pa. Super. 581 (z916).
The Act of June 2, 1871, Sec. 13, P. L. ,3oi, provides that "Any person
committed to the House of Correction by any other authority than the
Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia may apply for a writ of habeas
corpus and if the judge shall deem there is sufficient or reasonable grounds
for granting the same, he shall enter upon a rehearing of the evidence and
either discharge the individual, modify or confirm the commitment."
Before the statute, the hearing in habeas corpus opened the matter de
novo and the court sat as a committing magistrate. Com., ex rcl., Joseph v.
Supt. House of Refuge, i Ash. 248 (Pa. 1831). The principal case holds
that the act has limited the power of the court as a magistrate in that the
time of re-commitment must not exceed the original commitment. Such
action would not be within the term "modify" in the act. For similar
interpretation of "'modify" see State v. Lawrence, 12 Ore. -97 (Ss), and
State v. Tucker, 36 Ore. 291i 0goo). Nevertheless, according to the prin-
cipal case errors of the magistrate's record may be corrected, as the limita-
tion of the act applies merely to the commitment. Accord, Com. v. Supr.
House of Correction, 22 Dist. R. 92 (Pa. 1913); to remedy a defect in the
transcript, Com. v. Supt. louse of Correction, iS Dist. R. 6ot (Pa. i909);
to correct an omission in the charge, on which the prisoner was committed,
Com. v. Supt. House of Correction, 19 Dist. R. 1o54 (Pa. i91o). In one
case it was held without discusion of the act that the court could not com-
mit the prisoner where the magistrate's record was faulty. Com. v. Dvorkein,
48 Pa. Super. 618 (1912). -
The courts are not limited in their power as magistrates except in so far
a! their power of commitment is limited by the act. Accordingly, the re-
lator may be held in bail if it appear that he is guilty of another crime than
the one charged before the magistrate. Com. v. Supt. House of Correction,
j8 Dist. R. 5o7 (Pa. i9o9) : Com. v. Supt. House of Correction, i9 Dist. R.
io49 (Pa. i91o), following the earlier case of Com. v. Hickey, 2 Pars. 317
Pa. (1843).
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EvVITY-SpEcIFic PURFORMANC-E-CONTRACTs ENFORCEI PLE-EFFECT OF
ALTr.Ei1 CoNDlroNs-WAR-Where specific performance was sought of a
contract which involved parties of different belligerent countries it was held:
since the contract was immediately ended by the war, thus rendering per-
formance impossible, therefore specific performance would not be granted.
Lindenhcrger Cold Storage and Canning Co., Ltd., v. Lindenberger, Inc.,
el al., 235 Fed. 542 (1916).
The English decisions are based upon the leading case of Taylor v.
Caldwell. 3 B. & S. 826 (1863), which held that, where the parties must
have contemplated the continued existence of the subject-matter of the con-
tract as necessary for performance, the courts will imply the condition that
the parties .shall be excused where performance is rendered impossible by
the accidental destruction by fire of the subject-matter. This decision was
followed by the "Coronation Cases" which held that an unforeseen event,
the failure of the king to be crowned upon a certain day, relieved the parties
of further performance, though the contract was not void ab initio, and
everything should remain as at the time of impossibility. Krell v. Henry,
2 K. B. 74o (i9o3). Money already paid could not be recovered, though the
other did not perform. Chandler v. Webster, i K. B. 493 (194). So,
today, where the plaintiff has partly performed -when the war rendered
further performance impossible, the plaintiff could not even recover on a
.quantum inrcitif basis. Enoch Shipping Co., Ltd., v. Phosphate Mining Co.,
t,39 L. T. 94 (1915). Seamen may recover additional wages for a contract
to continue their voyage, for there is a new and valid contract. Liston v.
Owners of Steamship Carpathian, 2 K. B. 42 (j9t5). The contract is
dissolved, though a suspension in case of a force majeur is expressly pro-
vided for, if the postponement involves an alteration of the contract. Dis-
tington Hematite Co, Ltd., v. Possehl & Co., W. X. ti7 (Eng. 1916). A
contract to sell the whole of a zinc supply to a German firm, containing
a stipulation that the contract should be suspendcd in case of a force
majeure, is dissolved, for it would prevent the country from using its
resources for the benefit of the nation. Zinc Corpn., Ltd., v. llirsch, i
K. B. 54t (1916). Since the contracts are absolutely dissolved, it follows
that they cannot be enforced in equity.
The principal case might well have been decided upon the ground that
the vendor here could not force the vendee to buy what he could not enjoy,
Denne v. Light, 8 De G., M. & G. 774 (1857), and hence, on the ground of
mutuality, the court will not force the vendor to sell.
EvDE-.cE-Boox ACcouNTS-CORROBORATIVE PR'sosE-In an action on a
book account, one of the parties used a memorandum book, to refresh his
memory. Objection was made to the admission of this memorandum in
evidence as corroborative of the party's testimony. Held: It was not error
to admit the memorandum as corroborative of the party's testimony. Nelson
& Wallace v. Gibson, 98 At. ioo6 (Vt. 1916).
There is little harmony in the decisions on the question of whether a
party's own books of account or book entries are admissible to corroborate
his oral testimony. In some jurisdictions they are admitted. Donahue v.
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Connor. 93 Pa. 356 (i88o); Bean v. Lambert, 77 Fed. 862 (i96). In Mas-
sachusetts and New York among others they are held inadmissible. Bank
v. Whitney, 85 Mass. 454 (1862); Re Smith, 85 Hun. 359 (N. Y. t8g5).
Where rejected it is on the ground that to admit them would be to allow
parties to manufacture evidence in their own behalf. Bank v. Whitney,
supra.
Where a party's witness is impeached, he is usually allowed to produce
his books to corroborate that witness. Fain v. Edwards, 33 N. C. 305 (185o).
So, also, a party's books may be used by his opponent to contradict the
testimony of the party's witness. Hartley v. Weideman, 175 Pa. 3o9 (896).
But where the book account has been used as a memorandum to refresh
a witness's memory, and he then testifies from memory, not from the book,
it is generally held that the book cannot be admitted to corroborate his
testimony. Palmer v. Hartford Dredging Co., 73 Conn. 182 (19oo) ; Lucas
v. Metropolitan St. Rwy. Co., 56 App. Div. 4o5 (N. Y. igoo). Contra to
these decisions are the principal case and Gross v. Scheel, 67 Neb. -23
(1903). -k 4
When a memorandum'is used to refresh a witness's memory, it must
be produced in court on demand for inspection and cross-examination by
the opponent, Duncan v. Seeley, 34 Mich. 369 (1876), and it is reversible
error to refuse to order this done, Tibbets v. Sterberg, 66 Barb. 2oi (N. Y.
i87o).. The opponent may have it read or handed to the jury if he wishes
to cast doubt on the reality of the refreshment of the witness's memory,
Com. v. Jeffs, 132 Mass. 5S (1882); Smith v. Jackson, 71 N. W. 843 (Mich.
(1897), or he may make use of it as evidence in his own favor. Payne
v. Ibbotson, - L. J. Ex. 341 (Eng. i8s8).
Evnw..FNcE-Do.mci .- DF.cLAR.,TIOxs-.-A third party made declarations
concerning his domicile, which were attendant upon acts then performed.
Held: The declarations were admissible to show an intention -to reside, not
because they were a part of the res gestae, but because they were made in
support of his interest and material to the issue. Wilbur v. Town of
Calais, 98 Atl. 913 (Vt. 1916).
The question of domicile involves an inquiry as to a person's acts
and the intention with which such acts are done, as in the principal ease.
Chase v. Chase, 66 N. H. 588 (i89); Watson v. R. R. Co., 152 N. C. 215
(igio). The early Massachusetts cases were governed by a principle sub-
stantially that of the "Verbal Act Doctrine," Wigmore, Sec. 1784, and ad-
mitted evidence of the intention only when it accompanied, qualified, or
explained acts relevant to the issue of domicile, or was part of the res
gesiae. Cole v. Cheshire, 67 fass. 444 (1854)-. Though this is still the
rule in some jurisdictions, Chase v. Chase, supra: Holyoke v. Holyoke, iIo
Me. 469 (1913), it has been overruled in Massachusetts, where declarations
showing intention are now admitted, whether or not they accompany acts
in such cases. Viles v. Waltham, i57 Mass. 542 (1893). A libellee may
testify as to his intent concerning the establishment of a domicile. Kapigian
v. Der Minassian, 212 Mass. 414 (1912). A person's own testimony about
such intention will control where there has been an actual removal, Kemme
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v. Brockhaus et al., 5 Fed. 16- (MSOi); or. if the declarations are free from
suspicion. Wright v. R. R. Co., ct a.. 151 N. C. 529 (19o9). Though such
declarations are sufficient, they are not conclusive. Wilberding v. Miller,
io6 N. E. 665 (Ohio 1913). Less weight will he accorded the person's
declarations than his acts and all the surrounding circumstances. Collins
v. City of Ashland, 1i2 Fed. 175 (igoi) : Holt v. Hendee ct a!., 248 I1. 288
(igo). If unaccompanied by any act of which they are explanatory. such
declarations are entitled to little or no weight as evidence. Gourlay v.
Gourlay. T5 R. 1. 572 (1887). Since the right to choose a domicile implies
a right to declare one's choice, this declaration of intention is'not inad-
missible as a self-deserving declaration. In re Newcomb's Estate, 84 N. E.
950 (N. Y. 19o8).
INSURANCE-FOREU;N CORRATION-JVRISDItCTON OF SUBJECT M1ATTER-A
foreign insurance company, not a mutual company, may be sued for illegal
assessments in direct violation to a policy, since no interference with the
internal management of te business is necessary. Frick v. Hartford Life
Insurance Co., j59 N. W. 247 (Iowa 1916).
The rule is, that if a life insurance company. incorporated under the
laws of one state, has agreed to subject itself to service of process in an-
other state, then suits will lie both in law, and in equity, against such for-
eign corporation in favor of resident shareholders, who have clear contract
rights to be protected. Cantagnino v. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, T57 Fed.
Rep. 29 ('9o7); Pfeffer v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., 16o App. Div.
N. V. 876 (1914). Because the assessments do not rest within the dis-
cretion of the defendant company's directors, but their amount is fixed
by contract; and therefore it is within the scope of equity jurisdiction
to cause an accounting to be made, and a balance rendered. Lake Shore
Telephone Co. v. De Groat, io9 Minn. j68 (1909): Harrison v. Hartford
Life Ins. Co., 201 N. V. 545 (i9ii). But in many cases, it is hard to con-
strue, whether the suit is one brought to enforce a policy, or one which
will interfere with the internal management of the company. Eberhard v.
Northwestern Life.Ins. Co.. 210 Fed. 52o (1914). Many states hold, that
a suit to enjoin the collection of illegal assessments, is not maintainable,
on the ground that the relief sought, would require an investigation into
the internal affairs of the corporation. Clark v. Life Assn, 14 Dist. CoL 154
(1890): Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 331 (1915).
A member of a mutual insurance association is bound by all the rules
and regulations which may be thereafter lawfully adopted. Benjamin v.
Mutual Reserve Fund Ass'n, 146 Cal. 34 (19o5), and therefore a court
cannot undertake to control, or exercise visitorial power over the internal
management of such a foreign association. Taylor v. Mutual Life Ass'n,
97 Va. 6o (igoo); Kelly v. Thomas, 234 Pa. 419 (191). But if such an
association amends its by-laws and conqtitution as to destroy wholly the
essential features of a contract of insurance, the policyholder or member
may bring an action for ihe premiums paid, with interest thereon. Ebert v.
Mutual Life Ass'n, 8x 'Minn. 116 (190o); Strauss v. Mutual Life Ass'n,
128 N. C. 465 (gox).
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The reason that courts generally decline such jurisdiction rests on
grounds of expediency and public policy, because of a want of power to
enforce a decree, rather than on the question of jurisdiction to make it.
Babcock v. Farwell, 245 111. 14 (1910).
PROPERTY-LANDLORD AmD TENANT-.NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY To TUIRD
PERSO.s-A leased premises to B. who failed to keep closed a door in the
sidewalk which gave access to steps leading to the basement. There was
no allegation that the doors were improperly constructed. C fell into the
cellar way and sued A for personal injuries received therefrom. Held:
The premises were not dangerous when leased and became so only because
of the way in which B, the tenant, used them, therefore the tenant alone
is liable. Dammeyer el al. v. Vorhis, 113 N. E. 765 (Ind. App. 1916).
The principal case is in accord with the general rule that where there
is no defect in the construction of the premises and the accident results
from the manner of use, the tenant in possession alone is liable. Duffin
v. Dawson, 211 Pa. 593 (19o5); Opper v. Hellinger, iOt N. Y. Supp. 616
(19o6); Taylor v. Loring, 2-oi Mass. .283 (1909). However, the tenant is
not liable where some third party creates the dangerous condition and the
tenant could not have discovered it by the exercise of reasonable care and
diligence. Fehlhauer v. City of St. Louis, 178 Mo. 635 (19o3). Where the
premises leased are a nuisance the landlord, of course, remains liable,
Cerchione v. Hunnewell, 215 Mass. 58S (1913), but he is not liable for a
nuisance created by the act of his tenant. Shipley v. Fifty Associates, iot
Mass. 251 (869). If the tenant covenants to repair, the landlord is not
liable for injuries resulting from the breach of that covenant. Lindstrom
v. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities, 212
Pa. 391 09o5) ; likewise he is not liable for the tenant's negligence in mak-
ing the repairs. Mayer v. Schumpf, iii Mo. App. _ (19o5). The land-
lord who retains control of certain parts of the premises for the common
use of his tenants must keep those parts in a reasonably safe condition.
Shonenger Co. v. Mann, 219 111. 242 (i9o5). Where a nuisance arises neces-
sarily from the expected use of the premises the landlord is liable. Louis-
ville & N. Terminal Co. v. Jacobs, log Tenn. 727 (19o3). If the landlord
creates a nuisance on the demised premises he is equally liable with his
lessee who has notice. Pickens v. Cool River Boom & Timber Co., 54 W.
Va. 445 (9o3). Where certain safeguards are required and are not put
up, both the landlord and the tenant are liable. Doepfner v. Michaelis, t44
Fed. io2 (9o6).
PaopERTY-VLLs-TEsT.AMEN'rA R C.\'.\CTY-I NSANE DLLuSIoN-SPIR-
ITUALIs.\i-A belief iii spiritualism is not of itself conclusive evidence of
mental aberration such as to destroy testamentary capacity; the jury must
determine the effect of such belief. Dunham v. Holmes, I13 N. E. 845
(Mass. i9g6).
In an action to probate'a will, there must be substantive evidence of
lack of mental capacity in order that the case may go to the jury. Thomas-
son v. Hunt, 185 S. W. i65 (Mo. 1916). Io re Mclntyre's Estate, .59 N. NV.
317 (Mich. x916). The will of one who believes in spiritualism is not on
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that account void, nor is it evidence of mental unsoundness, Robinson v.
Adams, 62 Me. 369 (1874); Raison v. Raison, z48 Ky. 1i6 (1912); nor is
the fact that the belief is illogical or preposterous, evidence of insanity.
In re White, 121 N. Y. 4o6 (i89o). It must appear that the testator be-
lieved, or admitted, that he was influenced by the spirits in some way in the
preparation of his will, that it was the offspring of such belief. Meuth
v. Meuth, 157 Ky. 784 (1914). Thomas v. Thomas, j86 S. W. 993 (Mo.
19i). Mere belief in spiritualism is not sufficient to prove that testator
did not have the requisite capacity to make a will, the delusion necessary,
must be an insane delusion. Brown v. Ward, ;3 Md. 376 (1879). In re
lienry's Estate, 149 N. W. 605 (Ia. 1914).
A delusion, such as to render a will invalid, is an insane belief, a
mere figment of imagination, a belief in the existence of something which
does not exist. Grill v. O'Dell, 7- Ati. 984 (Md. 19io). Herr's Estate-
Vilson's Appeal, 2i Pa. =23 (i916). The question always is, whether the
act under investigation, was done upon consideration of existing facts, or
under the influence of a delusion that controlled the will of the doer; the
proof of a delusion may be found in the surrender of the will to inaginary
directions, regarded by the victim as those of God, or of spirits speaking to
him from another world. Middleditch v. Williams, 45 N. J. Eq. 72-6 (1889);
Taylor v. Trick, j65 Pa. 586 (1895). But a mere belief in metempsychosis
without more, is not an insane delusion. Buchanan v. Pierie, -o5 Pa. 123
(i9o3). In considering whether the testator's free volition has been over-
borne or controlled, the jury must consider his age, his physical and mental
condition, and all the circumstances surrounding him. Lehman v. Linden-
ineyer, 1o9 Pac. 956 (Col. 19io).
SURFTYSHIP AND GUARANY-NOTICE To GUARANTOR Op AC PrAxcE oF
GUARANTY-Iln an action on a contract of guaranty, where the contract was
executory and uncertain as to the amount and time, the court overruled a
demurrer to the declaration. Held: Notice of acceptance not being al-
leged, and the contract sued upon not being positive and certain in its
terms, the court erred in not sustaining the demurrer. Brown Grocery
Co. v. Planters Bank of Americus, 89 S. E. 523 (Ga. 196).
An absolute and unqualified guaranty becomes effective as soon as it
is acted upon and notice to the guarantor is not necessary. Hall's Exr
v. Farmers Bank of Ky., 23 Ky. L. R. 1450 (19o); Frost v. Standard
Metal Co., 215 I11. 24o (19oS). A guarantor of future credit is entitled to
notice from the party e:ctending the credit. Acme Mfg. Co. v. Reed, 197
Pa. 359 (i9oo) ; 'Wanamaker v. Benn, 5o Atl. 512 (Del. rgox). The principal
case is in accord with the above general rules. If the guarantor would
not know. of himself, whether the offer had been accepted or not, he is not
bound without notice reasonably given after performance. Bishop v. Eaton,
161 Mass. 496 (T894).
Where notice is necessary, it may, however, be waived by the guar-
antor. Swisher v. Deering. 204 I11. 203 (19o3); Sands v. Marchionda,
186 Mass. 270 (1904). Notice of acceptance need not be proved to have
been given in writing, or in any particular form, but it may be inferred
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by the jury from facts and circumstancecs which will warrant such an
inference. Hickox v. Fels, 86 I1. App. 216 (1899). Information from any
source is sufficient. Greer Machinery Co. v. Sears, 23 Ky. L R. 2o25
(i9o2); Lynn Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Andrews, iSo Mass. 527
(1902). Where notice is necessary it must be pleaded, or a waiver thereof
must be pleaded. Goff v. Janeway and Carpenter, 26 Ky. L. R. 1266
(19o4). The construction of a contract of guaranty is governed by the
same rules as any other contract, Leyenson v. Lindenbaum, 158 N. Y. S.
355 (1916); thus in case the contract is ambiguous, it is construed most
strictly against the guarantor. lturley v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 68 S. W.
958 (Mo. 19o2). Where there is a proposal to guarantee the performance
of a party under a contract, before the contract is approved,* the guarantor
is entitled to notice of acceptance. Barnes Cycle Co. v. Schofield, in Ga.
880 (igoo).
TORTs-CoNSPIRACY TO PROCUR. A BRFACh1 OF CONTRACT-A, knowing
enough about a contract between B and the plaintiff to charge him with
a knowledge that it had not lapsed, though he supposed, in good faith, that it
had, entered into contract with B, the vendor of the land, to purchase
it. Held: This was a fraud in law, which rendered A and B liable for
conspiracy. McLennan v. Church et aL, i58 N. W. -3 (Wis. 1916).
Acts which do not constitute grounds for an action on the case, if done
by one alone, based upon fraud, force, coercion, etc., will not support a
civil action for conspiracy. Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Wood-
workers Union No. 131, i65 Ind. 421 (19o5); Sleeper v. Baker, 22 N. D.
386 (1911). The quality of the act and the nature of the injury are the
chief factors in such a case. Kimball v. Harman, 34 Md. 4o6 (187i).
Actual damage is the gist of the action. Haskins v. Rouster, 70 X. C. 6ol
(1874); White v. White, 132 Wis. 121 (1907).
Where the defendant procures a breach of contract of personal service,
the majority of the courts follow the leading case of Lumley v. Gye, 2
E. & B. 216 (853), and hold the one procuring such a breach liable.
Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485 (igoi); Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N. H. 345
(19o9). Contra, Brown Hardware Co. v. Ind. Stove Works, 69 S. V.
8o5 (Tex. i92); Boulier v. Macatley. 91 Ky. 135 (i89i). From this and
from the rule laid down in the preceding paragraph, it follows that a con-
spiracy to entice a servant to break his contract is actionable. Thacker
Coal and Coke Co. v. Burke, 53 S. E. 16i (NV. Va. i9o6). But these labor-
ing cases are based upon the English idea that the employer has a property
right in the employee and that the laborer is bound to the land, and hence
are not authorities in the case of a breach of an ordinary contract. Cham-
bers v. Baldwin, supra; and in ease of conspiracy, Sleeper v. Baker, supra.
Where the contract is not one of personal service, advice given in good
faith does not render one liable for a breach resulting therefrom. Legris
v. Marcatte, i-g Ill. App. 67 (i9o6). If the advice is given in malice.
one counselling such a breach is liable. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner
Dairy Co., io7 Md. 556 (igo8); Wheeler Co. v. American Window Glass
Co., 2o2 Mass. 471 (i909). It has been held that maliciously procuring
RECEIVT CASES
a breach of contract with a third person will not create a liability without
the addition of threats, fraud, falsehood, or coercion. Boysen v. Thorn,
78 Cal. 378 (1&3). As would be expected these rules apply to cases of
conspiracy. Thus an action for procuring a breach of contract will not
lie, except where fraud, force or coercion has been used. Sleeper v. Baker,
-supra. -
ToRs-Dt-ry To TRFP.tssER-M.\ISF.,SANCE-ThC plaintiff jumped upon
the step of a closed vestibuled car of a moving train and clung to the
hand hars. The conductor's attention being brought to his predicament, he
failed either to open the door or cause the train to be stopped. Due to
exhaustion, the plaintiff fell off. THe brought suit against the conductor
and the railroad. Held: lie may recover against both. Southern R. R. v.
Sewell, 9o S. E. 94 (Ga. Tgt6).
The plaintiff was a trespasser, but the case falls within the rule that,
after the discovery of a trespasser, one is bound not to do any wilful or
wanton act to injure him. Tanner v. R. R., 6o Ala. 621 (1877). Any act
of misfeasance after knowledge of his presence is held wilful and wanton.
Haley v. R. R.. 113 Ala. 64o (18 96). The court rightly decides the act of
the conductor to be one of misfeasance. Though the failure to open the
door is non-feasance, the maintenance of motion is a positive act. It has
been repeatedly held that the continuing of a train after discovery of a
helpless tiespasser on the tracks is an act of misfeasance, Galveston R. R.
v. Olds, i12 S. IV. 787 (Te. igoS), and it has been held 'Misfeasance to
continue the operation of a trolley car after knowledge that an infant tres-
passer was on the platform. Pittsburgh R. R. v. Caldwell, 74 Pa. 421 (1873).
As the conductor has the power to stop the train by signal, he is re-
sponsible for its maintained speed, and the continuance through him is a
repeated positive act. The maintenance of a force started and controlled
by the actor is affirmative conduct.
One is not liable to a trespasser for non-feasance. Union Stock Yards
v. O'Rourke, 40 111. App. 474 (ig8t). The reason for the lack of positive
duties in the common law has been said to be the "attitude of extreme
individualism so typical of Anglo-Saxon legal thought:' F. H. Bohlen, 47
U. oF PA. L. Ray. 2-o. The inability of the'trespasser to recover is not
because of contributory negligence. Pollock, Torts, ioth Ed. z86. Before
the Statute of Westminster 11, 1.3 Edw. i, c. 24, the sole remedy for
personal injuries was the action of trespass. After 12-8, the action on
the case was allowed to licensees for injuries resulting from non-feasance
-the failure to warn, Oliver v. Worcester, IO2 'Mass. 489 (1869), but tres-
passers could not recover even for injuries resulting from misfeasance
unless he act was wilful and wanton. Blyth v. Topham, Cro. Jac. 138
(t6o7). Later "wilful and wanton" was interpreted as any misfeasance.
Palmer v. Gordon, supra. This seems to deny to the trespassers the benefit
of the Statute of Westminster I1: the coufits, due to their respect for
rights in land, seem at first to have limited the trespasser to his rights
before the statute, i. e., recovery for the quasi criminal trespass, and have
not as yet extended to him the full benefit of the action on the case.
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By the French Code Civil. Articles 1382. 1383, no discrimination is made
between trespassers and others; fault in the plaintiff, even though a con-
tributing element, being but a ground for mitigation of damages. Trib. Civ.
Lyon, 5 Mai i86s, Aff. Loup, D. P. 66. 3. 63.
Tot-rs-Nr:LiCaxcr-ELEcrmC CO.IP.ANs-Res Ipsa Loquiur-A boy,
turning an electric switch in his father's barn, was killed by a shock. The
shock was alleged to be due to the unsafe condition of a transformer.
Held: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. Seeherman v. Wilkes-Barre
Co.. 255 Pa. Yi (ig;6).
Where all the appliances for generating and delivering the electric
current are under the control of the electric company furnishing the same,
and injury results from handling the lights in the usual way, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur generally applies. Alexander v. Nanticoke Light Co..
58 At. io68 (Pa. 19o4): Alabama City R. Co. v. Appleton, 54 S. 638 (Ala.
1911). It is not essential that the current be generated by the company
charged with negligence. It has been held that the doctrine applies when
the injury is received while using a telephone, although the current causing
the injury was not generated by the telephone company. Delahunt v. United
Telephone Co., 64 Ati. 515 (Pa. i9o6). The doctrine does not apply, however,
when the telephone is used during an electrical storm, and lightning causes
the injury. Rocap v. Bell Telephone Co., 9 Atl. 769 (Pa. 1911).
The cases generally hold that the doctrine does not apply when the acci-
dent is due to defective wiring which was installed by the owner of the
building. Minneapolis Electric Co. v. Cronon, 166 Fed. 651 (1908); Harter
v. Colfax Electric Co., 1oo N. W. 5o8 (Ia. 19o4). It seems, however, that
the doctrine applies in such cases if a dangerous current is sent through
the wires. Reynolds v. Electric Co., 5g AtI. 393 (R. T. i9o4). Of course,
the doctrine does not apply if there is a more reasonable explanation of the
accident than the negligence of the company. Vestern Coal Co. v. Garner,
I12 S. W. 392 (Ark. r9o8).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies generally if an injury is caused
by a rail in the street which becomes charged with electricity. Clarke v.
Nassau Electric Rw.vy. Co.. 41 N. Y. S. 78 (1896); Way v. Charlestown Rwy.
Co., 84 S. E. 893 (W. Va. i115). But it has been held that in Pennsylvania
there is no presumption of negligence when a person traveling on the
street is injured by an appliance of a company using electricity on or over
the street. Accordingly, if a live wire falls, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur cannot be invoked; actual negligence must be proved. Lanning v.
Electric Co., 229 Pa. 575 (i9"); Kahn v. Kittaning Electric Co., 238 Pa. 71
(1913). If the company, in such cases, knew the wire was down, this is
proof of negligence. Herron v. Pittsburgh, 204 Pa. Sog (x9o3).
TRADE MARxs-TRADE NAMES-GEOGRAPHICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE WORDS-
"OLD LExI. oG'o CLUBa"-An application for registration of a trade name
for whiskey consisting of the words "Old Lexington Club" was opposed on
the ground that it was a combination of a geographical name and a word
descriptive of quality. Held: These words used in combination are a
fanciful designation, arbitrarily selected to designate a certain product, and
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may be registered. Old Lexington Club Distillery Co. v. Kentucky Dis-
tilleries and Warehouse Co., 234 Fed. 464 (ig6).
It is fundamental in the law of trade-marks that no one can acquire
exclusive property in a geographical name. Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wallace
311 (U. S. i8;1), or in a word. letter, figure or symbol which is descrip-
tive of the product, or its kind or quality. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear,
2 Sandf. Super. Ct. 599 (N. Y. 1849). A misspelled descriptive word is
within this rule, Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Co., = U. S.-
446 (1goo), as is likewise the nickname of a geographical place, "Quaker
City". for Philadelphia. Quaker City Flour Mills Co. v. Quaker Oats Co.,
43 App. D. of C. _60 (1915). These principles are embodied in the
Federal Statute providing for the registration of trade-marks. Act of
February 2o, igos, c. ;92, par. 5 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1913, par. 9490). For
examples of such descriptive and geographical words see Hesseltine's "Law
of Trade-marks," pp. 34 and 6r.
Some measure of protection is. however, accor'ded the use of such
words. Though no one can claim an exclusive right to the use of a
geographical name, he may prevent another from falsely using the same
name. California Fruit Canners' Association v. Myer, io4 Fed. 82 (I8gg).
And even though another truthfully uses the same name, if he does so in
such a way as to amount to a fraud on the first user and the public, such
use will be restrained. Elgin National Vatch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case
Co., j79 U. S. 665 (901). In such cases it is said that the word, from
long use in connection with a particular article, has acquired a secondary
meaning, indicating that it is the product of a particular manufacturer
rather than the place where it is made. Metcalfe v. Brand, 86 Ky. 33t
(1887). Descriptive words may also acquire such a secondary meaning.
Furniture Hospital v. Dorfman, i79 Mo. App. 312 (1914). The protection
in these cases is accorded on the ground that it is unfair competition for
another manufacturer to use these names or words except in their strictly
geographical or descriptive signification. Sharer v. Heller and Merz Co.,
ios "Fed. 821 (9o); Standard Paint Co. v. Rubberoid Roofing Co, 224
Fed. 695 (1915).
Under the Act of February 2,o, i9o5, if such words have been exclusively
used for ten years before that date. they can be registered. Rossman v.
Gamier, 211 Fed. 40 (19T4).
For other cases in this series. see 57 U. OF PENNA. L. RV., 2,2; 62
U. OF PF. L. Rrx., 4.58 and 466; 65 U. OF PENNA. L. REv., ioo.
